Federalist Papers 59, 60, and 61 discuss the power of Congress to regulate the elections of members of Congress. This power is meant to be exercised by the individual states while allowing the federal government to make some blanket provisions to ensure some uniformity within the union. Some people worried that Congress might be able to make some rules which would favor some people over others with respect to the ability to be elected as a member of Congress. I found it very interesting that Hamilton stated:
the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people
Since then we have changed so that Senators are elected immediately by the people and there are growing numbers of people calling for a direct election for the president. As I have always argued on that topic, the establishment of an electoral college was made for reasons very different from an inability to counts the votes of all the people of the nation.
This subject also serves as an additional evidence of the value of having the states serve as laboratories of government. Often the various Federalist Papers discuss the virtues of the Constitution by comparing it favorably to the various state constitutions.
One final observation by Hamilton led me to an interesting if totally impractical idea:
I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations.
Rather than advocating term limits of the form that no member may serve in office more than 12 years perhaps we would be better served to say that every 8 or 12 years all sitting members of the house may not stand for re-election – that would impede if not destroy the infusion of any improper spirit that may prevail in congress "into the new members, as they come forward in succession."
