Federalist Nos. 76 – 77

Federalist Nos 76 and 77 discuss the power of the president to nominate people for high government offices. I notice that these papers use some of the very same arguments in defending these powers of the president as were used to defend other powers that were to be vested in the proposed executive. I also noticed another instance of an assumption which has since been completely reversed:

A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him.

Contrary to what Hamilton expected, it is now the exception when one president retains the services of someone appointed by a previous president unless the previous president came from the same party as the current president.

I also took note of the pattern by which the government was laid out. Those powers which had the greatest need for expedience (such as nominating and the making of treaties) were placed in the executive branch with the power to negate being given to the Senate where necessary. Those powers which had the greater need for deliberation (such as the making of laws) were granted to the legislative branch with the conditional power to negate (meaning that the veto was not absolute) given to the President. The setup realy is a very well constructed balance with the judicial branch present to independently arbit between parties when there were doubts regarding conflicting opinions