Federalist Papers 62 and 63 begin examining the Senate, just as the House has been examined in recent papers. I was quickly surprised to find this gem:
So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic. (emphasis added)
The notion that the larger states might dislike equal representation has become reality among some citizens of larger states.
I also found proof of how different our political system is now than it was in 1888:
The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. (emphasis added)
I would challenge anyone to show me an example of any of our states that regularly replaces one third of its representatives – let alone one half – either at the state level or in their federal delegation each election cycle. Sadly, our increased stability has not decreased the downside of the instability is was to replace:
It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood{or} if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated . . .
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY. (emphasis added)
Federalist 63 suggests:
the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
It is interesting to note that the Senate has come closer to being "a tyrannical aristocracy" since it began to be elected by the people directly than it ever was under the indirect model. Additionally, the change to direct elections of senators leads us to change the following statement:
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large.
That statement would now read:
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large.
Sadly we appear to be in the advances stages of the corruption of the people. (Although I admit that the Senate does not appear to be the cause of the corruption, nor was it necessarily propagated in that order.) Nor does the prescribed remedy appear very promising right now:
if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles.
Federalist 62 also included this statement (which should probably be engraved on the office wall of every national elected official):
It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust.
